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By Ma Cherry Trivedi
Dressing up the bride.
As one of the untapped frontiers of newly emerging 
markets, Myanmar is rich in natural resources, underpopulated 
but with growing purchasing power, and an easy place to do 
business. From the outside, the country is very inviting, and 
there is considerable interest in doing business in Myanmar 
today. But internally, we have several pockets of obstacles. 
I see Myanmar as a bride who we have yet to dress up and make 
pretty in order to fi nd the right suitor. 
So what are the ground realities of ‘going to Myanmar’? 
Law, laws everywhere, but…
In recent years, the government has taken proactive measures 
to introduce new legislation, the Myanmar Investment Law 
(MIL 2016) and a Companies Act, which was rolled out in 
August 2018, with the aim of opening up the economy to 
foreign investors. For instance, the new legislative decree 
allows foreigners to invest up to a 35 percent stake in local 
companies, paving the way for more foreign investor 
participation in industries like banking and sectors that 
were previously closed to foreigners. 
However, the problem with the new business laws is the 
frequency of their creation and the speed of change needed 
to adapt to them. There are huge variations in the actual 
enforcement of these laws that, in turn, lead to vague 
interpretations of the laws in question. This is a big deterrent 
for an investor who is looking to invest in Myanmar versus 
other neighbouring ASEAN countries where the investment 
regime is refl ective of clear laws, the regulatory engines are in 
full throttle, and they have very welcoming tax structures. 
Myanmar needs to provide such a clear and welcoming 
environment if it wants to attract investors.
Of these, the country’s regulatory engine adds complexity. 
The policy of putting the burden on the investor to suggest 
exactly what needs to be done to fulfi l the legal requirements, 
and the government taking a role to accept or reject the 
company’s actions, do not always attract investments. A good 
example is the new Companies Act, which places a heavy 
responsibility on corporate governance and the company 
directors, in a nation where governance is mostly rudimentary. 
Most businesses in Myanmar are family run, with both the 
board and management run by the same set of people. 
Nowadays, while we have a rulebook on corporate governance 
and the role of a director, the question is: Who will regulate 
all the violations and ensure that penalties are enforced? 
Likewise, a related issue is the formation of a body to resolve 
investor concerns and issues, a matter that is yet to 
be addressed.
As can be expected, enacting a law in itself doesn’t 
necessarily make it easier for foreign businesses to negotiate 
through the opaque legal and regulatory frameworks and 
economic policies. Business ethics don’t come automatically 
just because there is a law. What Myanmar needs today is 
a change in mindset and behaviour, and the people of 
Myanmar haven’t been given enough incentive for them to 
change their behaviour. So locals are eager and willing when 
it comes to do business, and incoming foreign companies are 
impressed with the written laws—until they realise that the 
locals are not necessarily playing by the rules (of law) due to 
the lack of regulatory body or framework. 
The problem with the new business 
laws in Myanmar is the frequency 
of their creation and the speed of 
change needed to adapt to them.
Crabs in a basket
Sometimes crossing a regulatory 
milestone does not mean that it would 
be smooth sailing from there. Let’s 
take an example. If I get a Myanmar 
Investment Commission (MIC) permit 
to register my business, it should also 
allow for possible exemptions on imports 
of materials and equipment required 
to run the business. But we find that 
once a business is registered, there is 
still the customs hurdle relating to the 
import of equipment, and that taxes may 
be levied despite the MIC exemptions. 
This ambiguity creates further challenges 
for both local and foreign investors.  
Taxes are another issue altogether. 
While all governments need to levy 
taxes for the running of the state, tax 
breaks bring foreign direct investment 
into the country. This is the dilemma 
the government needs to address. 
In addition, there needs to be a 
systematic overhaul of the tax system 
in Myanmar on how the government 
collects taxes from its citizens. New 
tax laws are aimed at levying taxes on 
businesses, but little is done to actually 
collect them from the citizens. There 
is also a need for a transparent and 
effective way to collect these taxes 
electronically. This will eliminate the 
old ways of negotiating on the amount of 
taxes and paying as little as possible. 
A further issue relates to service and 
commercial tax. We may be all for 
paying service tax—but there is a clear 
disconnect on what these taxes should 
be levied on. 
Today, inflation is rampant in 
Myanmar. Basic commodities like rice are 
expensive because cartels are exporting 
their produce rather than selling locally 
to feed the population. And the 
government compensates labour for 
this induced inflation by offering higher 
wages. In an emerging market that is 
desperately trying to attract foreign 
investment, labour must be cheap. But 
policies are very often contradictory— 
the left hand may not coordinate well 
with what the right hand is trying to do. 
Shortfall in human 
and technological 
infrastructure
When we talk about the lack of 
infrastructure in emerging markets, 
we normally refer to physical facilities 
l ike transportation, energy and 
communications. In my opinion, 
Myanmar faces more of a critical shortfall 
in human infrastructure, which inhibits 
the country’s ability to execute and 
implement its multitude of master plans 
and blueprints. No matter who is at 
the helm of a nation, leadership needs 
to bring in people who can actually 
execute. When there is a lack of 
relevant skills, regulations and legal 
enactments tend to be vague and 
often conflicting. Execution, therefore, 
becomes an impossible task.
The focus to date has been more 
on establishing internal political peace. 
While the agenda is noble, peace 
doesn’t always lead to economic growth. 
But I believe that the converse, more 
pragmatic and less idealistic, can be 
true—if I have food in my stomach, I 
won’t look for a fight. 
The country also faces a technology 
gap. While future-oriented discussions 
in the world are taking place about 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution, 
blockchain, and robotics replacing 
human functions, Myanmar is still 
behind when it comes to having any 
sort of industrial revolution. The 
country produces raw materials, exports 
them to its neighbours, and imports 
finished goods. What the country really 
needs to do is to create secondary and 
value-added industries, so that the 
earnings on the same goods are 
elevated significantly.
There has been a steady growth 
in the number of small and medium-
sized enterprises. However, access to 
capital remains a huge hurdle for them. 
Businesses and individuals in Myanmar 
do not have credit histories. Historically, 
all loans from banks have been personal, 
with a person’s home typically serving 
as collateral. There needs to be 
change implemented by both the 
lending system and businesses on 
accepting output-based collateral or 
alternatively, creating a system where 
transparency on business operations, 
facilitated by technology platforms, 
will create a credit system to enable 
further lending.
Paralysis of analysis
The result of the human infrastructure 
shortfall is that many foreign consultants 
and consultant organisations are 
currently working with the Myanmar 
government and local businesses to 
facilitate the nation’s development. 
These range from international 
agencies and private investors to 
industry experts and academics. 
Everyone is giving advice and the 
government seems not to know what 
to do with the information. There is 
probably an overload of advice right 
now but with no takers. We need to 
Myanmar faces more 
of a critical shortfall in 
human infrastructure, 
which inhibits the 
country’s ability to 
execute and implement 
its multitude of master 
plans and blueprints.
ask ourselves: Does Myanmar really need all this? While advice 
has its place at the macroeconomic level, we need to focus 
at the micro level—how to get businesses to work!
Local and foreign investors are looking at growth 
and opportunity. Their thoughts run along the lines of: If 
there is lucrative business opportunity, how quickly can I 
enter? Are there laws and frameworks for me to secure the 
opportunity and run with it? Will I be able attain my return 
on investment and, in a foreign entity’s case, repatriate that 
money efficiently? Therein lie Myanmar’s challenges as an 
attractive place to do business. 
We don’t have to look too far for examples—our 
ASEAN neighbours have attracted huge amounts of foreign 
investment. Thailand has regime changes and political 
upheavals all the time, but the business environment, apart 
from a twitch here and there, remains untouched. The nation 
has clear, tight laws—it is solid. In contrast, the Myanmar 
Foreign Investment Law and Companies Act are heavy on 
rules but lack regulations and execution support; this brevity 
in fact makes it rather ad hoc and opaque, reducing business 
confi dence, especially for foreign investors.
From territorialism to nationalism
Historically, there has been considerable territorialism across 
regions. The leaders of these territories have been running 
their kingdoms and benefit from it. They are kings in 
their domain, in total control of what is taken out of the ground, 
what is grown on the ground, and what is traded. So how 
do we entice these domain leaders with the spirit of 
democracy and nationalism, to work for the benefit of the 
nation as a whole? What incentive is the government offering 
these domain leaders for them to give up what they already 
have? Currently, they don’t see economic gain in giving up 
their control. But once the economy gets going, the various 
ethnic groups will come to the table for a piece of the 
bigger economic pie. Hence there has to be a larger 
economic incentive.
Land reforms are a big part of the solution. Myanmar is 
sitting on the second largest landmass in Southeast Asia, and it 
is underpopulated compared to the landmass. Land is abundant, 
so it would make sense to let locals own the title to the land—
giving autonomy to those who have been working and living 
on the land for generations—and making them feel proud of it. 
It’s not just the land itself, but also what you do to the land, 
on the land and what you dig out from it that creates 
economic value. Instead, the government has kept all land 
ownership in its own hands. This has further accentuated 
the problem of ethnic discord and is also responsible for 
the chronic issue of land grabbing. Land is such a hard to 
quantify commodity that the speculative market on land 
ownership has at times driven prices higher than in Singapore 
or New York. Combine this with the traditional banking 
practice of using land and housing as collateral, and we can 
see why this makes access to capital a monumental task 
for businesses.  
Dumping in the name of industrial growth
The cement industry is a good example of how the existing 
policies do not help realise the full potential of local 
industry. Myanmar is rich in limestone, gypsum and coal—
key raw materials for cement production, and has good 
cement production facilities. But the government has 
allowed China, Thailand and India to dump cement into 
the country, claiming that the national facilities cannot 
produce enough for Myanmar’s predicted growth. A better 
solution would have been to place tariffs on cement as a 
finished product, and then allow for lower tariffs on 
intermediate products like clinker (an intermediate product 
ground with gypsum to produce cement), facilitating the 
development of a clinker-grinding industry in the country; 
or better yet, produce domestic cement. In a country where 
there is a huge supply need to fuel infrastructure growth, 
it behoves us to support domestic production of essential 
inputs like cement.
Import tariffs should be determined in such a way that 
the local businesses are not wiped out, as it is in the national 
interest to have a healthy cement industry. Instead, these 
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businesses are perishing, unable to withstand the onslaught 
of international competition, and incurring massive bank 
debts that they cannot repay because they cannot compete 
with imports. There is also an inherent lack of electric power 
in the country to support industries; another shortfall of 
infrastructure for economic growth.  
Selling to buy, a colonialist model
Myanmar’s food processing industry is almost non-existent, 
despite it being a produce-rich nation. It is cheaper to 
sell mangoes to Thailand and then import mango juice 
in return. Physical infrastructure presents huge obstacles 
as we see an alarming spike in cost structure combined 
with a declining demand base as soon as you move out of 
Yangon or Mandalay. So Myanmar ends up exporting its 
produce in bulk and importing finished products. And it 
doesn’t end there—Myanmar sells gas to its neighbours like 
China and Thailand; and Thailand produces electricity and 
sells it back to Myanmar. 
When multinationals like Nestlé, Johnson & Johnson 
and Procter & Gamble enter a country to sell their 
products, they typically don’t set up their own facilities— 
they buy factories, distribution channels—and even local brands. 
But in Myanmar, there is no factory line available, no electricity, 
it is hard to find labour, and raw materials imports are 
expensive—not to mention laws that provide unsure footing. 
Thus, global fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) companies 
prefer to import finished goods because the supply chain 
infrastructure is missing. They are not looking to produce 
in or even move a part of the production chain to Myanmar. 
Although registration of new companies has been 
streamlined, it is still an uphill battle to start a facility because 
of the difficulty in acquiring land (although due to the cash 
crunch some landowners are now willing to put their land on 
a long lease) and setting up a factory. Procuring labour and 
importing equipment is expensive, and even bringing raw 
materials like fresh produce from one region to where the 
factory is set up is expensive. The factory is usually set up where 
the demand is, such as Yangon, but the supply of raw materials 
may be a distance away. Investment in infrastructure has 
become imperative to Myanmar’s economic growth.
Putting the house in order and 
dressing up the bride
Because of the past history of land grabbing and concessions 
grabbing, most companies undertook massive debts from 
local banks to finance their acquisitions to build their supply 
chains. When those acquisitions did not result in actual 
production, the banks were left with massive non-performing 
loans. Things were going well during the times of the jade 
trade, which was primarily with China. The revenue streams 
from the jade trade were utilised to get loans to buy hotels, 
mines, or land for factories. But then China curtailed the 
jade trade. Businesses that had gotten themselves into 
this speculative mass of debt that hinged on the jade trade 
ultimately defaulted with the banks, including some 
very large companies that the central bank is hesitant to 
foreclose and liquidate.
Foreign investors wanting to enter Myanmar don’t have 
a full inventory of the businesses that are available for 
investment. Also, the businesses are often in shambles, because 
they did not practise anything close to the global standards 
of governance or regulation. These are largely family-run 
businesses with personal and business accounting records 
intertwined, being managed like one big joint family 
household. So Myanmar today is an opportunistic merger and 
acquisition, and joint venture market. It needs locals to 
dissect these mega-conglomerates, relook at the portfolio 
and ring-fence each one, recognising assets they can revive 
and thereafter finding a strategic partner for each. If we can 
pick and choose parts of a company and find a strategic partner 
in a way that its bank debt is paid off, or alternatively dissolve 
the entity, it may free up the market. This is currently a 
huge opportunity in Myanmar, and a necessary first step to 
bringing in foreign investment. 
Myanmar today offers tremendous opportunities, if one 
knows what to do and where to look. Investors are searching 
for low labour cost options in Asia, and the options are few 
and far between. Myanmar has the potential to draw in 
these investors. But before that can happen, the government 
needs to address the issues related to long-term planning 
and execution. We see a lot of Myanmar companies in debt, 
so we need to resolve this, dress up our brides, and find 
mutually beneficial partners. 
Most of all, Myanmar needs support and engagement 
from the outside world if change is to take place in this very 
complex nation that is struggling to establish a democratic 
system of its own.
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